



Developing a Collaborative BGP Routing Analyzing and Diagnosing Platform

Tsinghua University APRICOT 2024 APNIC 57 March 1, 2024







Outline

- Background
- BGP Hijacking Detection Algorithm
- Functionality of the BGPWatch Platform
- Future Work





Collaborative Community

- Work of 19 organizations (listed alphabetically)
 - AARNET (AU)
 - APAN-JP (JP)
 - BdREN (BD)
 - CERNET (CN)
 - DOST-ASTI (PREGINET, PH)
 - ERNET (IN)
 - Gottingen University (DE)
 - HARNET (JUCC, HK)
 - ITB (ID)
 - KREONET (KR)


- LEARN (LK)
- MYREN (MY)
- NREN (NP)
- PERN (PK)
- REANNZ (NZ)
- SingAREN (SG)
- Surrey University (UK)
- ThaiREN (TH)
- TransPAC (US, APAN/GNA-G Routing WG)






BGP Hijacking

BGP hijacking often leads to catastrophic consequences




Solutions to BGP Hijacking

- Preventing the hijacking before it happens
 - RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure)
 - ASPA(Autonomous System Provider Authorization)
- Monitoring to detect the hijacking
 - Route Views
 - RIPE RIS
 - BGPstream
 - GRIP
- Mitigating the hijacking
 - Announcing a more specific prefix
 - Contact other networks to filter routes








MOAS and BGP Prefix Hijacking

- MOAS (Multiple Origin AS) : A single IP prefix has multiple AS numbers claiming to be the origin for that prefix
- MOAS is a critical characteristic of source hijacking
- MOAS is not solely caused by hijacking
 - Multihoming
 - Traffic Engineering
 - DDOS Mitigating
 - Anycast Address






Determining the legitimacy of MOAS is a major challenge




A Rules and Machine Learning Combined Method



- Initially, train the machine learning classifier.
- During operation, the platform fetches BGP ROUTE feeds, extracts MOAS.
- Rule-based filters are used to sift through a large volume of legitimate MOAS.
- Then, the machine learning classifier is utilized to categorize the remaining MOAS.


Rule based Filtering

- ROA Filter: Sync with public repository using Routinator, every minute
- IRR Filter: use Internet Routing Registries to assist in filtering, sync every day
- Provider-Customer Filter: CAIDA as relationship database
- TOPO Filter: Hijacker and Victim in the same AS-PATH
- Admin Filter: Same administrator etc., sync with WHOIS every day
- Frequency/Duration Filter: Frequency/Duration longer than a threshold



Machine Learning based Filtering

- Features
 - MOAS TYPE, AS Rank Difference, Business Relationship, Geographical Relationship,
 - Announcement Activity, Hijacking Activity,
 - Edit Distance of AS name, org, desc,
 - AS type, Degree and Coreness of AS,
 - Prefix type
- Classifier
- Extreme Randomized Trees






Path Hijacking Detection

- Path hijacking can evade MOAS, but usually cause unseen AS link
- State of the art detection technique
 - Treat all unseen links appearing in the control plane as suspicious event
 - Then validate the event through the data-plane probing
- Limitation
 - Unseen links are very common
 - Intense data-plane workload
 - Inefficient and difficult to guarantee real-time






Detecting Fake AS-PATHs based on Link Prediction


Link Prediction

- Evaluate the authenticity of unseen links with link prediction and filter the benign unseen links
- Link prediction: a technique for inferring whether a link is likely to exist between two nodes from an existing observable portion of the network
- Is AS link predictable? Graph characteristics of AS-level topology
 - Power-law distribution
 - Negative degree-degree correlation
 - Hierarchical structure




Unseen Link Prediction

- Select Deep Graph Convolutional Neural Network (DGCNN) as the link prediction algorithm
- CAIDA AS relationship & AS location、 type and rank
- Training with positive and negative samples
- The accuracy reached 0.95 and the AUC reached 0.98



Framework: Combining Link Prediction and Rules

- Link prediction is used to find suspicious unseen links, and rules are used to improve the confidence level
- The accuracy of positive AS-PATHs is about 99.5%
- The accuracy of Type-1 path hijacking is 87.5%



Rules


- If any rules are successfully matched, the suspicious score is increased by 1.
 - The number of unique ASes in AS-PATH is greater than the pre-set threshold.
 - The suspicious link with a single-digit ASN at the end of the AS-PATH.
 - The Damerau-Levenshtein edit distance of the two ASNs of the suspicious link is no more than 1.
 - The AS-PATH has AS loop, and the link is in the loop.
 - The AS-PATH violates the valley-free rule.
 - The AS-PATH causes traffic detour.

• When a path score reaches a threshold, it is judged as hijacking.



Parallel Computing and Clusters to Handle Big Routing Data

- There is a huge amount of routing data from RouteViews, RIS, CGTF.
- We improved the system by Parallel Computing and Clusters.





Evaluate Harm Level


• Use Prefix information and AS information to evaluate Harm Level

high level

Ongoing Possible Hijack Events

103.120.14.0/24-hijack1708563695 (Ongoing Possible Hijack Events
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Victim AS: <u>397423</u>	Hijacker AS: <u>147287</u>
Victim Country: US (United States)	Hijacker Country: IN (India)
Victim AS Name: TIER-NET	Hijacker AS Name: DATAPARA1-AS-IN
Start Time: 2024-02-22 01:01:35	End Time:no data
During Time: no data	Time Zone: UTC



Domains in Prefix and AS TYPE

- TOP 1M domain:
 - Tranco: <u>https://tranco-list.eu/</u>
 - Cloudflare: <u>https://radar.cloudflare.com/domains</u>
- Convert domain name to IP Prefix
- Get AS type from ASdb:
 - https://asdb.stanford.edu/
 - ASdb is a research dataset that maps ASN to organizations and industry types using data from business intelligence databases, website classifiers, and a machine learning algorithm.
 - Hosting and Cloud Provider





Open Source

https://github.com/thudragonlab/source-hijacking-detection

https://github.com/thudragonlab/bgpwatch-frontend

https://github.com/thudragonlab/bgpwatch-backend

https://github.com/thudragonlab/bgp-analysis

🖟 thudragonlab / source-hijacking-detection Public

<> Code 💿 Issu	es 🕄 Pull requests	Actions	Projects	③ Security	🗠 Insights
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L thudragonlab Update README.md		8dbaf23 - 2 days ago	🕚 10 Commits
TSU-BGPMonitor-Consumer	init		2 weeks ago
TSU-BGPMonitor-Producer	fix		2 weeks ago
example	init		2 weeks ago
script	init		2 weeks ago
static	init		2 weeks ago
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	add license		2 weeks ago
C README.md	Update README.md		2 days ago
README_CN.md	init		2 weeks ago

🖶 thudragonlab / bgpwatch-frontend Public

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
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public	init		2 weeks ag
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.env.production	init		2 weeks ag
🗅 .gitignore	init		2 weeks ag
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LICENSE	init		2 weeks ag
🗅 Makefile	init		2 weeks ag
C README.md	Update README.md		2 days ag
README_CN.md	update readme		last wee
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BGPWatch: Prefix Hijacking Detection Platform

- Knowledge-based real-time BGP hijacking Detection System
- Public BGP event reporting service



- Based on MOAS/subMOAS
- Rely on Domain Knowledge (ROA, IRR, AS relationship, routing path, accumulated information, etc.)

elect even	it type	Select harm level	el Time zone	S	Select time period ((by Start Time)		Duration	Select	t for event by keywords	
All		All	GMT+8		2023-04-13	3 10:24:41 - 2023-04-23	3 10:24:41	All	QP	lease enter search key	
¥	Event Type	Level	Event Info	Р	Prefix Num ≑	Prefix Example	Start Time	÷	End Time 💠	Duration 🗘	Detai
- 24			Victim:IS/AS12969 (Vodafone_Iceland)		193.4.4.0/24	100 1 1 0 00 1	0000 01 10 1				
221	Possible Hijack	low	Attacker:KR/AS9860(NHIS-AS-KR)		193.4.5.0/24	193.4.4.0/24	2023-04-13 13	:56:24 20	023-04-13 13:58:24	4 0:2:0	detai
222	Possible Hijack	low	Victim:IS/AS12969 (Vodafone_lceland) Attacker:KR/AS9860(NHIS-AS-KR)		2	193.4.4.0/24	2023-04-13 13	i:43:36 2 ⁱ	023-04-13 13:49:53	3 0:6:17	detai
223	Possible Hijack	high 68 websites in the prefix.	Victim:US/AS398823 (PEGTECHINC-AP-02) Attacker:ZA/AS328608(Africa-on-Cloud-AS)		t	154.93.32.0/19	2023-04-13 11	1:47:11 2:	023-04-14 06:47:14	4 19:0:3	deta
224	Possible SubHijack	k low	Victim:US/AS6253 (PRUASN) Attacker:US/AS6030(WORLDNET5-10)		2	prefix: 161.151.112.0/22 subprefix: 161.151.114.0/24	2023-04-13 10):52:15 2	023-04-13 13:58:59	9 3:6:44	deta




https://bgpwatch.cgtf.net



Quick Response, Event replay, Comments

- About 5 mins delay
- Notify users immediately when an event is detected, minimizing damage from hijackings
- Event replay can help users understand the procedure, and analyze the extent of the impact of the event
- Comments from users can help improve the platform



	Add Comment									
Accept/Reject	• Accept	Reject								
Description	I'm owner of this AS, I confirm that \ldots									
		ii ii								
		Cancel	ОК							



Subscribe Hijacking Events for AS and Send Alarm

Prefix (Change H	lijack	AS Peer	Change	AS F	Path Change								
elect ev	vent type	S	elect harm le	evel		Time zone		Select time period (by Start Time)		Duration	Selec	t for event by k	keywords
All		~	All	~		GMT+8	~	2023-11-10 1	0:22:41 - 2023	-11-20 10:22:41		Q	945	
*	Event Type	e Le	evel		Even	nt Info		Prefix Num 🌲	Prefix Example	Start Time ≑	End Time 🌲	Duration 🌲	Detail	Comment
1	Possible Hija	ck l	ow A			AS945(8964) 827(VV-NETWC	ORK)	1	23.150.11.0/24	2023-11-19 11:01:13	2023-11-19 11:15:16	0:14:3	detail	
2	Possible Hija	ck l	م wo			AS945(8964) 827(VV-NETWC	DRK)	1	23.150.11.0/24	2023-11-19 09:00:47	2023-11-19 09:15:20	0:14:33	detail	
3	Possible Hija	ck l	ow A			AS945(8964) 827(VV-NETWC	ORK)	1	23.150.11.0/24	2023-11-18 19:00:46	2023-11-18 19:15:19	0:14:33	detail	
	Hi,													

Hope this message finds you well. Greetings from the Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace at Tsinghua University. We have developed a BGP hijacking detection system (BGPWatch, https://bgpwatch.cgtf.net).

Our system shows that prefix 23.150.11.0/24 is normally announced by your 945; however, at 2023-11-18 11:00:46 (UTC), prefix 23.150.11.0/24 is also announced by 200827 Detailed information is available here.


We would like to confirm with you whether this is a hijacking event or a false alarm of the system. Please click here to provide us with your feedback. Your time and response are greatly appreciated and will be very helpful for our research.

Have a good day!

APN Best regards, FOUNDA Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace Tsinghua University



Overview--Statistics for Anomaly Events





Do statistics by economy, AS, and by yearly, monthly, weekly, and daily



Compare with other Platforms

GRIP: Violate ROA

Potential Victims	Potential Attackers	Largest (Sub)Prefix	# Prefix Events	Start Time	Duration	Suspicion	Category	Туре
usAS834 NLAS49981	ptAS24768	185.206.250.0/24	1	2023-11-15 15:15	5 hour	High	Pefault Tr Worthy	moas

BGPWatch: Compliant with RC	DA
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Possible Hijack	low	Victim:PT/AS24768(ALMOUROLTEC) Attacker:US/AS834(IPXO)	1	185.206.250.0/24	2023-11-15 23:18:07	2023-11-16 04:25:30	5:7:23	det
	ASN		Pre	fix		Max	< Length	
ROA	AS24768		185	5.206.250.0/24		24		
							1. 法在上海	





Compare with other Platforms


	BGPWatch	GRIP	BGPStream
Delay	5mins delay	5mins delay	More than 2 hours
Event replay	\checkmark	×	\checkmark
Event statistical analysis	\checkmark	×	×
Event level evaluation	\checkmark	×	×
Benign MOAS report	\checkmark	\checkmark	×
Email Alarm	\checkmark	×	×
Accuracy	High	Medium to High	Low
			一门 注意






Tools for Network Operator

- Dashboard: AS info, prefix, peers
- Routing Search:
 - Aggregated forward routing path
 - Reverse routing path
 - Bi-direction routing path
- Subscribing, Alarming






https://bgpwatch.cgtf.net






Dashboard



Dashboard: IPv4/IPv6 Key Peers and All Neighbors Information



		4608
		6262
	TOP IPv6 C-P	7645
		20144
	Prefix Amount	56132
		137188
		135893
		▲ 1/2 ▼
		3356
		6461
		4637
	TOP IPv6 P-C and	2914
	Prefix Amount	11537
		17559
		59947
		2516
		16509
		32098
	TOP IPv6 P-P and	62240
	Prefix Amount	13335
		a 18403
		= 7713
		▲ 1/2 ▼
		Austral
		United
		 United
	Peer Country Distribution	Indones
	Distribution	New Zea
		Singapo
		E Canada
		▲ 1/12 ▼

Provider 📓 Peer 📓 Customer 📓 Unknown					Search for ASN, Organization name or country			
All IPv6 Neighbors								
	AS neighbors $\ensuremath{\hat{\Rightarrow}}$	Organization	Country/Region ≑	AS customer cone 💠	Relationship	Export	Import	
1	<u>24</u>	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	United States	2	peer	0	2	
2	<u>42</u>	WoodyNet, Inc.	United States	11	peer	0	80	
3	<u>101</u>	University of Washington	United States	42	peer	0	13	
4	<u>112</u>	DNS-OARC	United States	1	peer	0	2	
5	<u>293</u>	ESnet	United States	40	peer	62	40	
6	<u>703</u>	Verizon Business	United States	98	peer	0	48	
7	<u>714</u>	Apple Inc.	United States	2	peer	0	269	
8	852	TELUS Communications Inc.	Canada	247	peer	59	33	
9	<u>1103</u>	SURF B.V.	Netherlands	24	peer	63	13	
10	<u>1221</u>	Telstra Corporation Limited	Australia	1748	peer	31	713	
		Tota	1 458 < 1 2 :	3 4 5 6 46	>			


All Neighbors

Key Neighbors





Multiple Routing Path Search






Support Prefix / IP, IPv4 / IPv6 Return paths of all sub networks and super networks of the input prefix Group prefixes with the same routing path




Reverse Routing Path (TOPO)




- Support Prefix / IP, IPv4 / IPv6
- The system will search the best matched prefix and return the reverse routing tree
- With better interactivity
- Click an AS or input AS number, the system will highlight the path to the AS
- The number of layers to display can be selected



Bi-Routing Path




Path Change







Router Jitter









2023-11-07 03:25:00 (UTC)

BGP4MP_ET1699298706.327942[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298706.027942[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298706.02302[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298706.02302[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.02302[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.824630[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.824630[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.83473[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.683473[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.689676[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.689676[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.689676[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.6896763[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.6896763[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.689676300[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.699676[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.69662[W|2001:253:1:::01]38272[2a0b:340:90::48] BGP4MP_ET1699298806.69662[W|2001:253:1:::01]3

BGF4MP_E11099299901.368.30(W)2001263.11:c01)38272[2400:4340.90::/46 BGF4MP_E11099299902.00030]A[2001263.11:c01]38272[2400:4340.90::/46 BGF4MP_E11099299947.366906[W]2001263.11:c01]38272[2400:4340.90::/48 BGF4MP_E11099299947.26605A]2001263.11:c01]38272[2400:4340.90::/48] BGF4MP_E11099299967.26605A]2001263.11:c01]38272[2400:4340.90::/48]38272.38255.23911 6939.3356.20473.205610][GP]2001253.11:c01]0[0]23911:6939.38255:23911]NAC

BGP4MP_ET|1699298990.315185|A|2001:253:1::c01|38272|2a0b:4340:90::/48|38272 38255 23911 6939 3356 3356 3356 20473 205610|IGP|2001:253:1::c01|0|0|23911:6939 38255 BGP4MP_ET|1699298992.353198|W|2001:253:1::c01|38272|2a0b:4340:90::/48





4136 BGP4MP_ET[169229643].26851[162246433]:8:1[38022420054447].22[30223366 5294 7669 39689](GP[24447]:3833:5151[0]0]3563 335622 33658 335601 3357 BGP4MP_ET[169229643].36851[4]2(241):833:5151[38022]26054447].22[3022 3365 [294 7669 39689](GP[2447]:3833:5151[0]0]3563 335622 33658 3356573 335 BGP4MP_ET[169229641].853214[24041]:833:5151[38022]26054447].22[3022 2693 47669 39683](GP[2447]:3833:5151[0]0]3022:1200 38022:12104 BGP4MP_ET[169299648.23804].2401:833:315:1]38022[26054447].22[3022 2693 47669 39683](GP[2447]:3833:5151[0]0]3022:12100 38022:12104 BGP4MP_ET[169299648.23804].2401:833:315:1]38022[26054447].22[3022 2693 47669 39683](GP[2447]:3833:5151[0]0]3022:12100 38022:12104 BGP4MP_ET[16929648.23804].2401:833:315:1]3802[1605447].22[3022 2693 47669 39683](GP[2447]:383:315:1]0]3022:1200 38022:12104 BGP4MP_ET[16929648.23804].2401:833:315:1]3802[26054447].22[3022 2693 47669 39683](GP[2447]:383:315:1]0]3022:1200 38022:12104 BGP4MP_ET[16929648.23804].2401:833:315:1]3802[26054447].22[3022 2693 47669 39683](GP[2447]:383:315:1]0]302[2005447].2401383.255[302].21003382:12003382:1000382:12003382:12003382:1200382:1200382:1200382:1200382:1200382:1200382:1200382:1200382:1200382:120

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


OPEN API










Future Work Plan

Objectives	Work Plan	Tentative Timeline
	Find obscure Looking Glass VP regularly	Dec. 2023
Develop an integrated Looking Glass platform	Develop integrated Looking Glass platform	Feb. 2024
	Develop Looking Glass API	Mar. 2024
Use Looking Glass to further check	Develop data plan detection method and decision algorithm	June 2024
routing hijacking at the data plan	Integrate the algorithm to the system	Aug. 2024
Implement path hijacking detection and	Develop path hijacking detection method	Nov. 2024
routing leak detection methods	Develop routing leak detection method	Jan. 2025
Continue to maintain and fix bugs in the BGPWatch platform	Continually test and get suggestions from user	Throughout the entire project duration
Continue community development and engagement, and international collaboration	The second phase of the project funded by APNIC Foundation (Dec.06, 2023 – June 06, 2025 (18 months)) Welcome new partners to join!	Throughout the entire project duration

Open Looking Glass Vantage Point


• Paper: "Discovering obscure looking glass sites on the web to facilitate internet measurement research"——CoNEXT'21



1,446 known LG VPs in 386 cities of 75 countries 910 obscure LG VPs in 282 cities in 55 countries

- ✓ The 910 obscure VPs cover 8
 exclusive countries and 160
 exclusive cities, where no known
 LG VPs have been found before
 ✓ The 8 countries are mainly
- distributed in **East Africa**

and South Asia




Periscope has found several hundred VPs (364)






An Integrated Looking Glass and Open API



Data Plane Detection



Looking Glass vantage point

Representative services

• Possible Hijacking?

1. Multi Home, Proxy

2. Prefix Migration

3. Hijacking

- When a hijacking occurs, it will affect the service
- Approach: Test representative service from VPs





Comments and Suggestions?

Contact us at: sec@cgtf.net



